New Issues Arising Under Section 1983 by Schwartz, Martin A
Digital Commons @ Touro Law 
Center 
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 
2002 
New Issues Arising Under Section 1983 
Martin A. Schwartz 
Touro Law Center, mschwartz@tourolaw.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/scholarlyworks 
 Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Litigation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
18 Touro L. Rev. 641 (2002) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Touro Law 
Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ 
Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
NEW ISSUES ARISING UNDER SECTION 1983
Martin A. Schwartz'
We have held this program for so many years partly
because the United States Supreme Court has rendered a truly
extraordinary number of decisions dealing with so many facets of
Section 1983 litigation.2 The Supreme Court decisional law itself
is very extensive, but there always seems to be a new issue waiting
in the wings. Hence, my theme for this discussion is that there is
always a new issue. Take the issue presented to the Seventh
Circuit recently in a case entitled Dye v. Wargo.3 Dye raised the
issue of whether Frei could be sued under Section 1983. 4  You
might ask, well, who is Frei? Frei is a police dog, and the Seventh
Circuit was asked to decide whether Frei, who was named as a
B.B.A., cum laude, 1966, City College; J.D., magna cum laude, 1968,
Brooklyn Law School; LL.M., 1973, New York University. Professor of Law,
Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. Admitted to the Bar of New
York, Federal District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New
York, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the U.S. Supreme
Court. He was Managing Attorney for the Research and Appeals Bureau of
Westchester Legal Services and an Adjunct Professor at New York Law School.
He has litigated cases in the U.S. Supreme Court. He is the author of a
bimonthly column in the New York Law Journal titled "Public Interest Law,"
has lectured for the Practising Law Institute and is co-chairman of its annual
Supreme Court review and Section 1983 litigation programs. He is the co-
author of a multi-volume treatise on Section 1983 civil rights litigation entitled
"Section 1983 Litigation: Claims and Defenses" (3d ed. 1997), "Section 1983
Litigation: Jury Instructions" (3d ed. 1999), and the author of "Section 1983
Litigation: Federal Evidence". He has also written numerous articles on civil
rights issues. The author acknowledges the valuable assistance of Evan M.
Zuckerman and Ronnie Jane Lamm in the preparation of this article.
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), which provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress....
3 253 F.3d 296 (7th Cir. 2001).4 Id. at 299.
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defendant in this case, was a "person" who could be sued under
Section 1983.
The Seventh Circuit held that police dogs are not persons
that can be sued under Section 1983, but their handlers are.5 The
Seventh Circuit opined that there would be some serious problems
in holding that Frei could be sued as a person under Section 1983.6
There would be issues concerning service of process. 7 Was there a
valid retainer agreement? 8 The right to overtime pay under the
Federal Fair Labor Standards Act would be an issue, and there also
is a question of qualified immunity. 9 If Frei could be sued under
Section 1983, would the relevant qualified immunity issue become,
would a reasonable dog under the circumstances have known that
his conduct violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights? °
Those are the issues that the Seventh Circuit identified, but
other issues might arise. For instance, can a police dog engage in
state action? Does Frei's alert to his handler constitute hearsay?
1'
If Frei was named as a defendant, would the alert constitute an
admission? Is Frei a form of property under the due process clause
5 Id. at 300.
6 Id. at 299. The court went on to state:
A suit against a dog poses a whole host.., of problems. Was
Frei [the dog] served with process? Did he retain as his
lawyer, Lynn E. Kalamaros, who purports to represent all
three defendants? Was Frei offered the right of self-
representation under 28 U.S.C. § 1654? What relief does Dye
seek from the dog - Frei's awards perhaps? Could Frei claim
qualified immunity? If a reasonable person in the defendant's
position would not have understood that what he was doing
violated the Constitution, damages are unavailable. Must we
then ask whether a reasonable dog in Frei's position should
have understood that he was violating Dye's constitutional
rights?
Id; 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1994) states: "In all courts of the United States the
parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel, by the
rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes
therein."
7 Dye, 253 F.3d at 299.
8ld.
9 Id; see also 29 U.S.C. § 202 et seq. (2000).
'0 Dye, 253 F.3d at 299.
11 This statement would not be hearsay because under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, an out-of-court declarant must be a "person." See FED. R. EVID. 801.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment? There is a First Circuit case that
held that a pet raccoon was not a form of property, because the law
of that particular jurisdiction made it illegal to possess a raccoon.12
The United States Supreme Court decided a broad array of
questions dealing with Section 1983 last term, ranging from the
question of state action, to attorneys' fees, to questions dealing
with procedural due process, prisoners' rights, and the application
of qualified immunity in excessive force cases.
I. STATE ACTION
State action is a threshold question because without state
action there can be no Fourteenth Amendment claim, and without a
Fourteenth Amendment claim, there is no Section 1983 claim for
relief. The state action decision of last term was Brentwood
Academy v. Tennessee School Athletic Association.13 In a five to
four decision, written by Justice Souter, the Court held that the
defendant Athletic Association was engaged in state action because
its members consisted of virtually all of the public schools in the
state of Tennessee. 14 Given the make-up of the association, there
was an almost overlapping identity between the state public
schools and the association. 15  The association carried out a
regulatory function that the state itself otherwise would have
carried out, and this regulatory function was performed
overwhelmingly by state officials.' 6 The dominant rationale of the
decision was that state action was present because of the state's
pervasive entwinement with the operations of the association.17
12 Bilida v. McCleod, 211 F.3d 166 (1st Cir. 2000).
" 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
14 Id. at 291.
'" Id. at 299-300.
16 id.
17 Id. at 302. The Court stated:
The entwinement down from the State Board is therefore
unmistakable, just as the entwinement up from the member
public schools is overwhelming. Entwinement will support a
conclusion that an ostensibly private organization ought to be
charged with a public character and judged by constitutional
standards; entwinement to the degree shown here, requires it.
2002
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In finding state action in Brentwood Academy, the Court
distinguished its earlier decision in National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Tarkanian,18 on the ground that the NCAA was a
nationwide association that did not exercise the power of a
particular state; rather, the NCAA was a national organization of
colleges and universities.1 9 Perhaps, more importantly, the NCAA
included in its membership large numbers of private colleges and
universities. I think the result in Brentwood Academy is correct.
The Athletic Association in Brentwood Academy came very close
to being a governmental agency without actually being one,
considering the make-up of the association, the officials of the
association, and the nature of the function carried out by the
association.
Even though I believe the result in Brentwood Academy is
correct, there are several troubling analytical problems with the
Court's decision. First of all, I find it somewhat troubling that, on
these facts, four justices would vote to find no state action. These
justices emphasized the private nature of the association.2 °
Therefore, in future state action cases, where the state involvement
is not as pervasive, the decision in Brentwood Academy could
create difficulty for plaintiffs lawyers. I also think there are
problems with the way the decision was written, and with its
consistency with prior decisional law. At one point, early in the
decision, Justice Souter wrote that state action is a question that is
determined on a case-by-case, fact intensive basis; that there is no
rigid formulation, and that it is necessary to look at all the
circumstances of the particular case.21  However, just a year
earlier, in American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Sullivan,22 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court,
identified two state action doctrines.2 3 He referred to the public
function doctrine, which asks the question of whether the private
entity is engaged in a function that is historically, traditionally, and
18 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
19 Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 297-98.
20 Id. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Renhquist,
Justices Scalia and Kennedy).
21 Id. at 295-96.
22 526 U.S. 40, 58 (1999) (finding that a private insurer reviewing state
worker's compensation claims is not a state actor).231 Id. at 49.
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exclusively governmental in nature.24 He also referred to the close
nexus state action test, which asks the question of whether the state
had ordered, coerced or at least significantly encouraged the
private activity.
25
If one looks at the Supreme Court state action decisional
law, two other lines of state action doctrines can be identified.
26There is a joint action or joint participation doctrine. There is
also, whatever is left of it, a symbiotic relationship test.27 Just a
year ago, at this program, Erwin Chemerinsky28 and I had a mini-
debate; a fairly congenial debate, I might add, but we debated
whether there were two state action tests, as Erwin thought, or
whether there were four state action tests, as I thought. The
question is: What does one say now? Does one say that there are,
to follow Erwin's theory, maybe three state action tests; two plus
pervasive entwinement?29  Or if you follow my analysis of the
decisions, are there five state action tests? Or maybe it is more
accurate to say that there are no state action tests. In addition, I
believe the dissent in Brentwood Academy was quite correct in
pointing out that the majority was derelict in failing to provide any
type of definition of pervasive entwinement.
30
I find it odd that just a year after the Court in American
Manufacturers was so derogatory and critical of the earlier
14 Id. at 50.
21 Id. at 52.
26 See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (explaining that a
private person who conspires with state officials can be liable under § 1983;
"'To act "under color" of law does not require that the accused be an officer of
the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the
State or its agents,"' (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794
(1966))).
27 See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722-24 (1961)
(holding that due to the special facts and circumstance of the Delaware law,
under the symbiotic relationship test the restaurant's conduct constituted state
action).
28 Erwin Chemerinsky is a Sidney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law,
Legal Ethics, and Political Science at the University of Southern California Law
School. He is also the Director of the Center for Communication Law and
Policy at the University of Southern California.
29 See Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 295.
3 0 Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 314 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
2002 645
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decision in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority3' for its vague
state action language, that the Court would now render another
state action decision that adopts a new theory of state action,
pervasive entwinement, that is equally ambiguous and vague.
The reality is that if one looks at the range of United States
Supreme Court decisions dealing with the question of state action,
there are two lines of decisions. There is a group of decisions, and
most decisions fall into this category of cases, which apply what I
would call a type of structured approach.32 These cases employ a
state action test or series of tests, and they apply the facts of the
case to the particular issue before the Court. 3  There is a second
line of state action decisions, such as Brentwood Academy, which
are more ad hoc in nature. 34 The second line of cases examines the
totality of the circumstances, rather than employ particular tests.
35
Given these two lines of state action decisions, one never knows
how the next state action decision from the Supreme Court will be
decided. It certainly puts litigators and lower court judges in a
very difficult position.
There are unlimited numbers of other state action questions
that the United States Supreme Court has yet to decide. For
example, there is the important unresolved question of whether a
private prison corporation is engaged in state action.
36
31 Burton, 365 U.S. at 715.
32 See, e.g., Blum v.Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982). The Court,
applying more structured tests, held that a private entity's actions will only be
deemed state action when the state has either "exercised coercive power or has
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice
must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Id.
33 See, e.g., Burton, 365 U.S. at 722.34 See, e.g., Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 288.
" See id. at 295.36 See Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001) (refusing to extend
the Bivens doctrine to a private halfway house that housed federal prisoners);
Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 401 (1997) (holding that prison guards
who are employees of a private prison management firm are not entitled to
qualified immunity from suit for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983). See
also Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding
that the "'public function test' requires that the private entity exercise powers
which are traditionally exclusively reserved to the state" and that the defendant
private prison corporation and individual defendant prison guards were state
actors "in that they were performing the 'traditional state function' of operating
a prison.") (citing Hicks v. Frey 992 F.2d 1450, 1458 (6th Cir. 1993)); Giron v.
646 [Vol 18
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II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The issue of procedural due process presents an interesting
question when a dispute arises between the government and a
governmental contractor. Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers
3 7
involved a California statute that regulates the relationships
between the State of California and its contractors, and between
the contractors and its subcontractors. 38 The statute provides that
if the subcontractor is in violation of state law, such as a state law
setting forth a minimum wage requirement, the State of California
is authorized to withhold payments due to the contractor.39 The
contractor, in turn, is authorized to withhold payments due to the
subcontractor.40 That is exactly what happened in Lujan. The case
came to the United States Supreme Court because the contractor
had withheld payments that the subcontractor claimed were due
and owing under the subcontract.4' The subcontractor claimed that
since it was not paid under the contract, and was not given an
opportunity to be heard, it was deprived of procedural due
process.42 The Ninth Circuit agreed with that contention.43 Here is
a useful rule of thumb: if the Supreme Court grants certiorari in a
civil rights case in which the Ninth Circuit ruled for the plaintiff,
the overwhelmingly likelihood is that the decision will be reversed.
True to form, that is exactly what happened.
It was a short opinion and an easy reversal. It is an
opinion, which from the standpoint of a law school professor, is a
model of issue avoidance. There were some sticky questions in
this case that the Court avoided answering. For instance, there was
a question as to whether the contractor's withholding of payments
Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1250 (D.N.M. 1998) (holding that the
government function doctrine applies in New Mexico when the state delegates
the running of a prison to a private contractor and that the defendant prison
guard was a state actor).
17 532 U.S. 189 (2001).
3 Id. at 191.39 Id. (citing CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 1727 (West Supp. 2001)).
40 Id.
41 id.
42 Lujan, 532 U.S. at 193.
4 G & G Sprinklers v. Bradshaw, 204 F.3d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 2000).
2002 647
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constituted state action. The Court assumed that it did, but did not
decide the question.44  Another question was whether the
subcontractor was deprived of a protected property interest.
Again, the Court assumed there was a deprivation. of property,45
but did not decide this question either.
The Court held that there was no violation of procedural
due process because the subcontractor could bring suit in state
court for breach of contract either against the State of California or
against the contractor. 46 The Court held that an action for breach
of contract would provide an adequate remedy and satisfies
procedural due process.47 The subcontractor was not satisfied with
this remedy because a contract action in state court would likely
take avery long time to litigate. The.Supreme Court said it did not
care about the delay.48 The Court said that a breach of contract
action is the ordinary remedy in this context.
49
The Court stated that the subcontractor was not being
denied any present entitlement, but only payment he contended
was due under the contract. 50 I have no idea what that means., I
asked Professor Erwin Chemerinsky over the summer (I think of
Erwin as knowing everything), however, he was similarly puzzled.
I cannot make any sense of it at all: The subcontractor is claiming
payment under the contract.
I suspect that the rationale for the decision, which is not
articulated by the Supreme Court, but had been set forth in several
lower court opinions, is that the Court did not want an ordinary
breach of contract claim turned into a Section 1983 constitutional
claim. The Court essentially stated that this is a breach of contract
claim, so the subcontractor's remedy is to bring suit in state court
under state law for breach of contract.
51
44Lujan, 532 U.S. at 195.451d. at 198.
46Id. at 197.
48 Id. at 198.
48 id.
49 Lujan, 532 U.S. at 197.50 Id. at 196.
"' Id. at 197.
648 [Vol 18
NEW ISSUES UNDER SECTION 1983
III. PRISONERS' RIGHTS
The third issue I will discuss concerns a prisoner's claim
for damages for constitutional violations. Another rule of thumb is
that if the Supreme Court grants certiorari in a prisoners' rights
case, it is probably not going to be decided favorably for the
prisoners. That happened twice last term. The first case was Shaw
v. Murphy.52 The Supreme Court held that prisoners do not have a
First Amendment 53 right to give legal advice to fellow prisoners,
and if the prison authorities seek disciplinary action against a
prisoner for giving such legal advice, the only constitutional
limitation is that the action by the prison official must be
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. 54 Now, you
know how that standard usually plays out. It is highly deferential
to prison officials.
The second prisoner case, Booth v. Churner,55 dealt with
the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
("PLRA"). 6  In Section 1983 cases, the general rule is that
administrative remedies do not have to be exhausted in order for
the plaintiff to commence suit. However, the PLRA does require
that prisoners exhaust their administrative remedies when seeking
to challenge the conditions of confinement.57 In Booth, the
Supreme Court held that this exhaustion requirement applies when
the prisoner is seeking monetary relief, even if monetary relief is
not available administratively. There is a follow up PLRA
exhaustion case before the Supreme Court this term that comes out
of the Second Circuit, Porter v. Nussle.59 This case raised the
question of whether a prisoner's excessive force claim against a
52 532 U.S. 223 (2001).
a U.S. CONST. amend. I, which provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall
make no law.. . abridging the freedom of speech."
54 Shaw, 532 U.S. at 225 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987)).
55 532 U.S. 731 (2001).
56 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a)
(2000).
57 Booth, 532 U.S. at 733-34.
5 Id. at 741 n.6.
'9 534 U.S. 516 (2002).
2002 649
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prison guard is to be characterized as a challenge to prison
condition requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
60
There was a split among the circuits on this issue. The
Second Circuit in Nussle held that because the challenge was not to
prison conditions, (emphasis on the plural), but a challenge to a
prison condition, exhaustion was not required.61 The Supreme
Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that the exhaustion
requirement applies to prisoner excessive force claims.
62
IV. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
In Saucier v. Katz,63 the United States Supreme Court held
that a police officer who is charged with using excessive force in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, 64 either when making an arrest
or conducting an investigatory stop, is entitled to assert the defense
of qualified immunity.65 In order to understand the issue and the
holding, it may be helpful to think of this as a puzzle. The first
part of the puzzle is that when it is alleged that a police officer
used excessive force during an arrest or investigatory stop, the test
under the Fourth Amendment is whether the police officer's use of
66force was objectively reasonable. In other words, given all the
circumstances facing the officer, was this the type of force that an
objectively reasonable police officer could have used under the
circumstances? This Fourth Amendment test gives leeway and
deference to the judgment of the police officer.6 7  The police
officer gets the benefit of the doubt under this test. That is the first
piece of the puzzle.
60 Id. at 985.
6' Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2000), rev'd 534 U.S. 516
(2002).
62 Nussle, 534 U.S. at 531.
63 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
64 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides in pertinent part: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated."
6s Saucier, 533 U.S. at 209.
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The other piece of the puzzle is qualified immunity, which
is a defense that is generally entitled to be asserted by state and
local officials who carry out executive and administrative
functions. 68  The heart of qualified immunity asks whether the
defendant official violated clearly established federal law.69 But
that test itself is a test of objective reasonableness. 70 The idea is
that an official who acted in an unconstitutional manner, but did
not violate clearly established constitutional law, acted in an
objectively reasonable fashion and is protected by qualified
immunity. Conversely, an official who violated clearly established
federal law acted in an objectively unreasonable fashion, and is not
protected by qualified immunity.
When you put the pieces of the puzzle together, the issue
then becomes, is it possible for a police officer, who used force
that violated the Fourth Amendment, which was objectively
unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes, to nevertheless be
protected by qualified immunity? Can an officer act unreasonably
for Fourth Amendment purposes, but objectively reasonably for
qualified immunity purposes? If you turn the issues around, the
question becomes, is it possible for the officer to act reasonably for
qualified immunity purposes even though the officer acted
unreasonably for Fourth Amendment purposes?
The United States Supreme Court held, yes, it is possible.7'
That means a police officer's use of force could be found by a
federal court to be reasonably unreasonable. It was reasonable for
qualified immunity purposes, though unreasonable for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment. It is not the way we normally think out
our problems in our lives and in our relations with other people.
We normally do not say to people we are close to, "I know you
treated me unreasonably, but I understand that you were reasonable
in the unreasonable treatment." We do not usually evaluate things
that way.
The idea here under Saucier, is that the officer is given two
levels of reasonableness protection, one under the Fourth
Amendment, and the other under qualified immunity. The
68 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 199.
69 Id.
70id.
71 Id. at 206.
2002
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Supreme Court is of the view that a police officer's use of force
that turns out to be unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment
may reflect a reasonable mistake, either in evaluating the facts or
in evaluating the state of the law.72
It is definitely semantically awkward to think of an official
as acting reasonably unreasonable. I do not think, however, that the
decision is going to have great impact in terms of the way the
immunity defense is going to play out in a very large percentage of
cases. In the truly egregious brutality cases, the qualified
immunity defense is not going to help the police officer. In the
close cases, at least most of the close cases, the police officer will
get the benefit of the doubt anyway under the Fourth Amendment.
There may be a narrow range of cases in which the police officer's
use of force is found to violate the Fourth Amendment, but because
it is a close case, qualified immunity will tip the case in favor of
the officer. I do not think there are a large number of these types
of cases.
The decision may be important, however, because it places
pressure on district court judges to try to dismiss excessive force
claims against police officers early in the litigation. But, on a
summary judgment qualified immunity motion, if district court
judges do their jobs correctly, this should not be an important
factor, because excessive force cases usually have sharp factual
underlying disputes. The plaintiff claims, "I was just minding my
business; I was whistling some patriotic song and the officer shot
me in the leg." The officer responds, "No, the plaintiff was not
whistling a patriotic song; the plaintiff was cursing, threatening,
lunging at me, and had a knife." It seems to me that neither the
Fourth Amendment nor the qualified immunity issues can be
resolved until the relevant facts are resolved.
The immunity issue the Supreme Court did not decide in
Saucier was: what should a district court judge do when a
summary judgment qualified immunity motion is made and there
are disputed issues of fact that have be to resolved in order to
decide the qualified immunity defense? We will be talking about
that, I am sure, throughout the program.
72 id.
652 [Vol 18
NEW ISSUES UNDER SECTION 1983
V. ATTORNEY'S FEES
In Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia,
73
the Supreme Court held that in order for the plaintiff to be a
prevailing party under a federal fee shifting statute, the plaintiff
must secure either a favorable judgment on the merits or a consent
decree.74 This means that a showing by the plaintiff that the
lawsuit served as a catalyst that prompted the defendant to take
some type of corrective action, giving the plaintiff what the
plaintiff was seeking, will not qualify the plaintiff as a prevailing
party. For instance, if the government defendant granted the
plaintiff a public benefit or some type of license, this will not
qualify the plaintiff as a prevailing party, even though the lawsuit
accomplished its goal.
Buckhannon was brought under the Americans with
Disabilities Act75 and the Federal Fair Housing Act.76 However,
the Court's decision 77 made it quite clear that its rejection of the
catalyst doctrine applies to civil rights fee shifting statutes across
the board, including the fee shifting statute that applies to Section
1983 cases.78
The question of who is a prevailing party should be strictly
a question of statutory interpretation and congressional intent. But,
look at the lineup of the justices in this five to four decision. For
the majority, batting first, the author, Chief Justice Rehnquist (it is
World Series time, so I did it as a lineup). Batting second, Justice
O'Connor; batting third, Justice Scalia; batting fourth Justice
Kennedy; and batting fifth, Justice Thomas. The dissenters are the
so-called more moderate justices of the Court: Justices Ginsberg,
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. If you think about that alignment of
the justices, we have often seen that before in the federalism cases,
and in Bush v. Gore.79 Perhaps the particular alignment of the
7' 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
74 Id. at 600.
71 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 - 12213
(2000).
76 Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3601 - 3631
(2000).
77 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610.
78 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b).
79 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
6532002
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justices was mere coincidence, but one has to wonder: was the
Buckhannon decision truly based upon congressional intent?
Further, the decision effectively reversed the holdings of no less
than eleven circuit courts of appeals. The catalyst theory had been
rejected by only one circuit, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
80
It could be another coincidence that only the most conservative
circuit in the country had rejected the catalyst doctrine.
Putting these coincidences aside, I think it was a very
damaging decision for civil rights plaintiffs. After all, a civil rights
plaintiff can litigate a case for many years, and on the eve of trial,
the defendant's attorney can say, here is your license, here are your
benefits, and then seek to have the case dismissed as moot. The
plaintiff, who argues that her case served as the catalyst that
brought about the result she was seeking, will be denied fees,
which could be very substantial.
In a recently reported decision, a prisoner's rights case, the
plaintiff's attorney got $470,000 in attorneys' fees.81 In a short
opinion, the circuit court said those fees were awarded under the
catalyst doctrine, but since the catalyst doctrine is no longer good
law, the fee award must be reversed.
82
The Court in Buckhannan stated in dicta that the plaintiff
will not be able to obtain fees even if the plaintiff obtains
significant relief pursuant to a private settlement agreement.
8 3
Even that will not qualify the plaintiff as a prevailing party.
Buckhannan is bad law because the purpose of the civil
rights fee-shifting statute is to encourage the enforcement of the
civil rights laws by private parties. This decision retards that
purpose. It is bad logic. I am having difficulty understanding
why, for example, in my license illustration, it is less valuable for
the plaintiff to actually have the license than it is to have a
judgment declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to the license. I
remember a saying; "A bird in hand is worth two in the bush.,
8 4
8o Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 627 (referring to S-I & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ.,
21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994)).
s Johnson v. Rodriquez, 260 F.3d 493, 495 (5th Cir. 2001).
82 id.
83 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 694 n.7.
8 The American Heritage Dictionary of Idioms, available at
http://www.xrefer.com/entry/629583 (last visited January 7, 2003) An ancient
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Why is it that if the plaintiff has a license, the plaintiff is not a
prevailing party but, if the plaintiff has a judgment declaring the
plaintiff is entitled to the license, the plaintiff is a prevailing party?
It is also a decision that is bad for the administration of justice,
because it will make it harder to settle cases.
Greek proverb meaning "a benefit available now is more valuable than some
possibly larger future benefit."
6552002
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